Egypt’s Transition in the Health Sector: The Need for a Transition Plan for Universal Coverage

Egypt's Transition towards a Third Wave of Health Sector Reform (3)

Egypt’s Transition is currently understood and related to the role of a transitional government until an elected government is in place.  A Minister of Health’s role in a transitional government is difficult to define and if defined challenging to achieve.  This role was proposed in an earlier post to focus on restoring people’s confidence in the health sector, raising health staff moral, and paving the way for a third wave of health sector reform.  In all cases and after two waves of pilot health sector reforms as explained in an earlier post , an elected government would be expected to lead a third wave of reform based on a health care system suitable for Egypt that would replace the existing pluralistic and fragmented health care system.  That system that was not able to achieve two of its health outcomes: (i) financial protection; and (ii) client satisfaction considering that Egypt is progressing fairly well on achieving many of the Health Millennium Development Goals. 

A longer transition to achieve universal coverage that depends on a major health care sector system that leads (more likely dominates) the financing and delivery of health care services in Egypt will be required.  The decision of that kind of health care system is expected to be one of two options as explained in an earlier post: 


The first option is a social health insurance led system that is more reliant on tax revenues and is capturing some of the tax-based finance system functions.  In that case, SHI will be based on financing from contributions from those who can afford to contribute based on their ability to pay subsidized by government contributions to cover the premiums and co-payments for those who cannot afford to pay either totally or partially.  In that case, government’s contributions should be expected to come from the country’s general revenues and to be tax-based, preferably not based on ear-marked taxes.  This would represent a natural continuation of the second wave of reform and its pilot in Suez. 

Universal coverage would likely be achieved in stages as explained in a related post. However, The speed of this coverage would depend on Egypt’s ability to face a number of challenges, as discussed in a previous post, in terms of: (i) its ability to recover from the aftershocks of the revolution and resume its pre-revolution high growth rate, as well increase its level of GNI; (ii) its ability to formalize its economy with protected jobs; (iii) its ability to become more urbanized; (iv) its ability of building its health insurance administration system; (v) its level of poverty and society’s willingness to cross-subsidize the poor; (vi) its ownership of an efficient and functional provider network; and (vii) its ability to regulate. 

There will be additional specific key factors related to Egypt and its historical path to achieve universal coverage such as its payroll salary scale.  Current employer and employees contributions are based on basic salaries.  Once contributions are calculated on the basis of total salary (basic + variable), not only will the employee will pay much higher contributions, but also the employer will also need to carry the burden of higher expenditures.  In many cases, the employer will be the government which will mean additional burden on its already very tight budget, and in some cases it will be the public and private sector which will create burden on its products cost structure and will increase its prices, probably pushing inflation higher and driving more of the small enterprises into informality to evade its insurance contribution.

The second option is a national health led system which is tax-based with a directly managed provider network shifting to a purchaser-provider-contracting model. In that case, NHS will be based on financing from general revenues.  This system is more likely to declare universal coverage at a national scale in an earlier phase than a health care system based on SHI but probably will not be able to do that in reality.  The reality will be the same as an SHI based system, actual universal coverage will also happen in stages.  The key major challenge is that the NHS would require much more funding from the government to replace the contributions from employers and employees that would ease the funding.  This would mean that the government will need to allocate more budgets from the general revenues.  

On the positive side, an NHS might spend less based on some claims, produce better health outcomes due to its better ability to integrate with public health programs, would require less complicated structures to run the system, and would less impact the labor markets than SHI.  It is also a system that MOH would prefer to pursue given its proximity to its thinking and given the familiarity of its staff with its service delivery mechanism.  People might be more comfortable with this system as it doesn’t require them to contribute, unless user fees and co-payments are applied.

The purchase-provider-contracting model, within an NHS, might be a solution to resolve many of the inherent problems of an NHS in terms of system performance and client satisfaction, if it is complemented with strong regulation and quality standards.  Payment for Performance mechanisms would then represent a key feature of paying public health providers in the form of performance based financing.  As well, contracting not for profit non-governmental organizations that have access to the general population for secondary health care would be another key feature in the form of performance based contracting. 

In both cases, described above, a transition plan will need to be in place before embarking on its implementation and before that an explicit decision will need to be made by the elected government and the people’s assembly about the health care system to be adopted.  A transitional government  would be expected not to adopt one of the above mentioned systems before allowing a broad discussion among health sector stakeholders and the people about their system of preference as they will have to live with its consequences and will be obliged to commit funds for its financing probably by sacrificing other developmental priorities. 

Until we meet again....

Egypt’s Transition in the Health Sector: Opportunity for Raising Staff Moral & Restoring People's Confidence

Egypt's Transition towards a Third Wave of Health Sector Reform (2)

Egypt’s health sector has entered into a transition since its Cabinet has resigned in January 2011. The spirit of the revolution empowered health sector staff and a number of activists to raise a number of issues on their priority list.  A number of facebook groups interested in the health sector were formed allowing extensive exchange of views and in some cases lobbying for their views.   Monitoring feedback from these groups, the key issues raised were related to: (i) health workforce management and compensation; (ii) organization, governance and leadership of the health sector; (iii) health sector finance; (iv) responsiveness of the health system; and (v) quality of service delivery.   A common theme presented dissatisfaction with the performance of the health sector and an explicit sense of low morale.

On the positive side, these groups proposed solutions for the problems raised by them. One specific group, the Egypt Health Sector Reform Group, on its page proposed a list of priority actions to be tackled during Egypt’s transition.  Some of these are of short-term nature potentially capable of producing quick wins, as well could pave the way for a third wave of health sector reform once an elected government is in place.  

The purpose of this blog is to present an excerpt of this brainstorming, as I understood it.  Following a health systems framework, TWO proposed priority actions were selected under each element of this framework possibly feasible to be accomplished during the transition. It’s a message to those who are or will be in a decision making position in the health sector from those who are interested in the future of that sector.

Objectives

Two key objectives to be achieved during the transition could be defined:

1. Raising the morale of health sector staff and restoring people’s confidence in the management of the health sector and its services provision
2. Preparing for the period after the transition

Activities

Objective 1: Raising Staff Moral and Restoring People’s Confidence in the Health Sector

1.       Increase responsiveness of the health service delivery system in terms of improved coverage, utilization, and quality of health services and accordingly client satisfaction and people’s confidence in the health sector

·         Through introducing improvements in the public health system by addressing priority gaps in service delivery and treating patients with respect.

·         Through expanding health service delivery by partnering with the civil society and contracting NGOs for a minimum quality of service delivery agreed upon for a defined package of services 

2.       Motivation of health workforce and raising staff morale

·         Introduction of payment for performance for the health workforce to improve staff compensation for better performance, quality, and system responsiveness taking in consideration different incentives for different geographic locations.

·         Training of middle management for preparation of calibers needed for management and potential for staffing for senior management.

3.       Making available funds by reallocation from other sources

·         From the newly allocated budget for the Program for Treatment on the Expense of State; and from investment budget lines for payment for services for CSOs (as mentioned above), payment for performance for public health sector staff, and procurement of drugs, supplies, maintenance, and training.

·         Postponing the social health insurance law until an elected people’s assembly is in place to decide about the health system appropriate for Egypt

4.       Improving Governance

·         Establishing of an independent Quality Organization to accredit public and NGO providers for a defined package of services

·         The separation between the payor and provision functions within the organizational structure of the Health Insurance Organization.

Objective 2: Preparing the Health Sector for the period after transition

·         Broad participation by key health stakeholders in discussions on Egypt’s health sector problems and its possible solutions including reaching a consensus on the health system  that Egypt should adopt (National Health System or Social Health Insurance) based on the society’s values and expectations.

·         Joint Expert/Politician Reviews to the health sector to prepare a paper on Egypt’s vision for the health sector

·         Based on the health sector vision, an Expert team to prepare a Health Sector Strategy.

Is Social Health Insurance the Right Health Financing System for Egypt?

Egypt's Road towards Social Health Insurance - The Road to be Traveled (7)

At a time when Egypt is doing relatively well in reducing its child and maternal mortality, while facing extreme pressure on its budget to meet various demands by the public, in presence of notable inefficiencies in the health system presented mainly by fragmentation in the financing and the delivery of health services, and at a time when a draft social health insurance is presented for public discussion in a post-revolutionary situation that might allow to revisit health strategies designed in an earlier phase of reform, a question might be  posed before a final decision is made. Should Egypt stick to Social Health Insurance (SHI) as its main health financing strategy or could a better alternative scheme be available for Egypt to adopt. Is it too late to ask that question?

Governments usually aim to achieve universal coverage for health care for their people and people usually demands a health care system that meet their needs in terms of improved health, financial protection, and a system that is responsive and treat them with dignity.  To achieve that in Egypt, continues efforts have been put to reform the health care system increasingly since 1997; however, with modest efforts to include the public in that reform.  

Looking back, it is intriguing to note that during the last 60 years almost every attempt to reform the health sector in Egypt aiming to achieve this universal coverage promoting one health system or another as a means to achieve this end, ends up with an application of mixed and fragmented systems that were not able to meet the expectations demanded by the people.  I’ve always encountered this statement recurring in many international and national reports describing the health system in Egypt as “a pluralistic health system, consisting of a number of parallel public and private health care delivery systems and multiple financing intermediaries”.  The attempts to reform were not able to address this plurality and usually lead to more fragmentation of the system either at the delivery and/ or at the financing side ending up in a health system with multiple personalities.

The origin of this fragmentation has started a few decades ago, probably in the 50s and 60s, when two sets of parallel legalizations established the foundation for treatment on the expense of state (Presidential Decree 1754 in 1959 followed by Presidential Decree 1069 in 1964) and social health insurance (Law 75 in 1963 and Presidential Decree 1209 in 1964), probably trying to satisfy the demand of the people for better health care as well as a translation to Egypt’s constitutions placing the responsibility of provision of health care (Constitution 1956) and social insurance (Constitution 1964) including health to all Egyptians on the state.  These were followed by multiple additional decisions that further fragmented the delivery side that led to the proliferation of a number of governmental and public services delivery systems in addition to those of the Ministry of Health.  

And the question is “why is this happening?” Which system would be better for Egypt? A system based on general revenues and taxes or a system based on social health insurance?

Those who are in favor of tax-based systems argue for their system based on three points: (i) SHI discourages firms from hiring workers, and hence reduces employment and encourages informal labor markets; (ii) lack of coverage among certain groups during the often long period between establishing SHI and achieving universal coverage, and (iii) systematic variations in benefit packages and quality of care across subpopulations. 

On the other hand, those who promote SHI do that based on two points: (i) SHI provides an important additional source of revenue for the health system; (ii) by separating the purchasing of health care from its provision and encouraging selective contracting between providers (including private sector ones), SHI systems are able to achieve better quality health care at a lower cost than tax-financed health systems.

Certain studies focusing on studying the impact of these health systems on health outcomes in OECD countries suggested that SHI systems, on balance (i) have certain characteristics that make them more expensive than tax-financed systems,  (ii) do no better in terms of most health outcomes that are amenable to medical care despite the extra spending, (iii) may do worse in respect of outcomes that require strong population-level public health programs, and (iv) do worse in terms of encouraging informal labor markets and discouraging employment.  The findings of this study raise the following questions:

•  Why do we apply a system that could cost us more with no additional improvement in health outcomes at a time when budgets are tight? Would this contribute to efficiency?
•  Why do we apply a system that could increase informality in the employment sector when already two thirds of those working are informal workers without protection? Would this contribute to financial and social protection?
• Are there dangers on our achievements in public health? As SHI systems focus on individual members, or even families, would we lose the focus on the entire population by public health programs financed by tax-financed systems?  Would this contribute to improved health status and outcomes?

All of the above would lead to the following question, and another two subsidiary questions?

Can we apply in Egypt a system that can capture the better of the two systems and avoid their problems?

Question 1:  Can we have a tax-based system with a directly managed provider network shift to a purchaser-provider-contracting model?

Under this scenario purchaser organizations contract with providers rather than manage them directly.  This can be done by adopting the SHI purchaser-provider split model where purchaser organizations contract with providers, including those which are not public providers.  This could lead to lower expenditures and better health outcomes.  However, to what extent this can be done without risking coherence and integration in its public health programs? The Egypt experience in introducing the Family Health Funds, governorate health insurance organizations that were established to do the purchasing function, is an example of an attempt in that regard. The ownership of these organizations between the Ministry of Health and the Health Insurance Organization remained for a long time and it failed to elaborate a national organization that would provide oversight for such decentralized bodies called the National Family Health Fund.  Further, this was countered by the Ministry of Health by establishing provider organizations at district level called the District Provider Organizations to ensure the flow of funds through its organization, which were dismantled later as the Egyptian health system geared more towards social health insurance..

Or Question 2: Can SHI system increase its reliance on tax revenues and capture some of the tax-based finance system functions?

This seems to be feasible to be done and the latest versions of the new social health insurance law provides different articles that attempt to increase its tax base and revenues from sources other than that from payroll taxes, although earmarked taxes is being proposed. This is the new experience that has been facing long debate before and after the January 25^th revolution, and seems to continue for a while. The linkage of health insurance to family health services could be the basis for protecting the screening functions of public health programs.

At the end, a decision will need to be made by those who will represent Egypt in the new People’s Assembly and will then need to be implemented by the newly elected government in a few months to come.  This decision will need to select the system, SHI systems or tax-financed systems, which on balance would spend less, achieve better health, easier to go through the transition, and lead to better labor market outcomes.  

Until we meet again...

A Framework for Reading Egypt’s Social Health Insurance Law

Egypt's Road towards Social Health Insurance - The Road to be Traveled (6)

This blog is based on the work of international experts in the field of social health insurance that was adapted to Egypt's situation. Arabic versions of this blog will dig into more details of the framework but might not follow the same sequence of this blog. Because of limitations of space, some ideas presented in this blog will be discussed separately in future blogs.

The recent news about the upcoming law for social health insurance in Egypt and the messages transmitted about its potential modifications to ensure its achievement of social justice raised the question about how to read such laws and what should be included in it.  To help read this kind of social laws, once officially published for public dialogue, the presence of a reference framework could assist in that regard. In this blog, we will try to contribute some inputs that may assist in the preparation of such a framework, which we do not claim it will be comprehensive. This blog will not attempt to review or criticize the content of the currently circulated versions of SHI law.  As well, this blog will not differentiate between what should be mentioned as articles of the law itself or articles of its executive regulations due to their complementarily nature.

The logic of a social health insurance law would probably include the following:

• Definition of the social health insurance system
• How to make effective the mandatory and universal features of the system
•  Principles that the govern the system
• Transition from the current situation to an integrated and unified system
• Definition of terms
• Who are the Beneficiaries
• What to finance
• How to finance the new system
• Definition and main characteristics of the institution that will manage the system, including governance, functions, powers, financial management, and accountability
• Purchasing health care goods and services
• Consumer protection
• Role of Voluntary health insurance

The Definition. In defining the social health insurance system three aspects are to be considered:

1.  The nature of the social health insurance system
2. The objective of the social health insurance system
3. The institutional structure to implement the social health insurance system.

Also three main characteristics of the system would need to be taken into account:

1. Universal, meaning that it includes all Egyptian citizens
2. Mandatory, that is, all Egyptian citizens must participate (there is no opting out from paying into the system); 
3. Gradual, full inclusion of all citizens (with few exemptions) into the system over a defined period of time, OR Abrupt

The Principles. These usually refer to: solidarity; unit of subscription (family or individual); basis on need or demand; scope of services (primary, secondary, tertiary); subscription basis (mandatory?), financing not provision and separation of financing from provision; role of private for profit and non-profit in service provision based on contracting; role of state in financing the poor and near poor (partially or fully); tax exemptions for subscriptions; role of private health insurance (duplicative, complementary, supplementary)

The Transition. A a transition plan from a presently fragmented institutional structure dominated by the HIO to a single institutional structure in the future will be required.  Details for this transition could take place and developed in regulatory decrees.  An article in the law might state the principles for transition.  The transition would describe the way forward to arrive over time at an “integrated” (meaning putting in one place a social health insurance system. Four issues related to transition would need to be noted:

1. The responsibility of management of the system during transition
2. The management of enrollment of all non-covered citizens;
3. The management of those already covered by the existing HIO system and their enrollment into the new SHI if required, under a one “unified” system (in that case meaning the system managed by a single organization);  
4. The relationship to other existing parallel health care financing systems such as the Program for Treatment on the Expense of State (PTES)  and those funds flowing for public health services provision for curative care in Egypt.

The Institution. Social health insurance systems can only be implemented through an institutional structure.  A future entity might be established, which could be (a) a re-structured HIO, or (b) a totally new entity transformed into the unified entity for the management of the integrated social health insurance system with its own legal autonomous status. The law and/or its regulations will need to define the aspects that will be mandated for the future organization such as governance, autonomy, structure, functions, powers or attributes, contracting, and regional offices.

What to Finance. The law will need to refer to a unified set of social health insurance benefits, the health care goods and services covered by social health insurance for health care. The set of benefits usually is to be determined and updated by regulatory decrees to be provided by participating providers and for secondary care on referral of the gatekeeper.  The law also should require that the set of benefits is to be determined on an actuarial analysis to project financial implications.  Finally, there is a need to entrust the decision-making on defining and updating the set of benefits into the social health insurance entity to preclude political influence that could disturb the goal of fiscal responsibility

How to Finance. Financing would better be presented in the form of groups to be covered classifying those into three sectors (formal; informal; and targeted subsidized). The figures for financing, preferably and if the constitution allows, should not be included in the law itself as they would be subject for future change; however, this might be difficult in Egypt. To mitigate that articles will need to indicate that it will reviewed on periodic basis based on actuarial studies conducted by the Government. This applies to contributions and subsidies, as well as for co-payment levels

Providers and Suppliers - Contracting. Articles should stipulate that the social health insurance entity is a financial institution that funds the provision of health care goods and services to public and private providers.  Selection of providers and suppliers should be stated for those who meet the requirements for contracting with the entity to ensure that providers and suppliers meet licensing and certification requirements, among others, and for improving quality of care.

Consumer Protection. Articles that protect the interest of consumers will need to be included that reflects a framework for a system of consumer protection that could be part of the regulations. 

Voluntary Health Insurance. If the policy is to have a private/public mix in health care financing and delivery, then articles that allow individuals to purchase voluntary health insurance will need to be included.  These services could be duplicative, supplemental or complementary, but only after certified satisfaction of payment of social health insurance contributions

Until we meet again....

The factors facilitating Egypt’s transition to Universal Coverage

Egypt's Road towards Social Health Insurance - The Road to be Traveled (5)

What could be the factors that would speed Egypt’s transition to expand universal coverage using social health insurance?  We will try to respond to this question based on the experiences of other countries and opinions of international experts.  In principle, the lower the country has in terms of income per capita, the smaller the formal sector, the higher the prevalence of poverty, and the higher the dependency ratio, the more it would be challenging to initiate or scale up SHI. 

Economic Development, in terms of a country’s annual general level of income (GNI) and growth rate. The greater the income per capita the more capacity enterprises and citizens will have to prepay SHI contributions.  The higher the wages and salaries, the more opportunity to finance a broader benefit entitlements and the less there could be an economic burden of payroll tax. Tax revenues are likely to increase with income, facilitating the subsequent channeling of any government subsidies into SHI. Steady economic growth, therefore, is likely to enhance the capacity to prepay.

In 2010 before the January 25^th revolution, Egypt’s GNI was about USD 2,440 and its growth rate ranged between 5-7% annually. As a result of the slow in economic activity post the revolution, growth rate is predicted to go down to 2% or less for 2011. Egypt’s current GNI is similar to the GNI of those countries adopting SHI at the time of its introduction such as Germany (USD 2,237 in 1883), Austria (USD 2,420 in 1887), Belgium (USD 1,808 in 1851), and Japan (USD 2,140 in 1922). The same applies to growth rates.  Economic growth was either high or at least steady for each of these countries during the transition period.

Structure of the Economy, in terms of the relative sizes of the formal sector and informal economy. Many developing countries do have sectors where a notable part of employment is informal, thus facing difficulties in assessing incomes and collecting contributions from workers who do not receive a formal salary. This hampers protecting those working in the informal economy as SHI scheme relies on contributions. The larger the formal sector employment, the ease it would be to administer mandated payroll tax on employers and employees.

In Egypt, informality has been on the rise mainly due to two reasons: (i) a reduction in employment by the public sector and replacing those by employment using temporary contracts; and (ii) creation of most of the jobs in the private sector that are informal. More than half of those working are in the informal economy (53%) with an increased estimation of 20% of pre-revolution level. Looking more in-depth, 58% of those working don’t contribute to any social security scheme, 63% are working without contract, and 13% are working without being paid. As the public sector is shrinking and being perceived as the place providing “safer” jobs, and given the private sector’s inability to produce formal sector jobs, the challenges for coverage by social health insurance increase. 

Urbanization, determined by the distribution of the population intended to be covered. Population living in urban areas, with minimum quality of infrastructure and communications, and higher population density, is likely to be easier to cover than a widely dispersed rural population. About 43% of Egypt is urbanized with governorates ranging from high as 100% urbanized such as Cairo to a low as 22.5% such as Sharkia.  The more urbanized the governorate the more insured people would be present.

Ability to administer, in terms of availability of skilled labor force with capacities in bookkeeping, banking, and information processing; and related markets, such as in financial services, other insurance businesses that can provide appropriately trained personnel, actuarial, and legal services. Presence of a sound administration of social security system is in place would be a favorable factor.

Although HIO has been present for about half a century, yet most of its experience is in service provision and has lost a number of experts who understood insurance without being properly replaced. The HIO payer functions will need efforts to be built and investment in this area would be a pre-requisite if Egypt would continue to pursue health insurance as a financing scheme for universal coverage. 

Poverty Prevalence, in terms of size of government’s contribution to subsidize their premiums and co-payments. The higher prevalence of poor and near poor Egyptians, the more the government would need to contribute and the higher the burden is on the government’s budget. The society as a whole, and not only the government, would need to define what appropriate level of solidarity it is ready to contribute to cross subsidize the services of its poor people either fully or partially for the near poor.  The higher the level of solidarity, the more SHI is able to provide protection to its most vulnerable segment of its population. While policymakers could impose solidarity; however, without a society that believes in solidarity, it will be difficult to sustain SHI.   

Two more important factors that need to considered.  The first is the presence of efficient functioning provider networks, in terms of (i) ability to provide an improved access to members; (ii) ability to provide greater choice of providers to members, and (ii) ability to provide an environment that allows for quality-based competition among providers.  The second is the government’s capacity to regulate for quality and manage grievance procedures.

In summary, Egypt’s ability to expand universal coverage through SHI will depend mainly on the following: (i) its ability to recover from the aftershocks of the revolution and resume its pre-revolution high growth rate, as well increase its level of GNI; (ii) its ability to formalize its economy with protected jobs; (iii) its ability to become more urbanized; (iv) its ability of building its health insurance administration system; (v) its level of poverty and society’s willingness to cross-subsidize the poor; (vi) its ownership of an efficient and functional provider network; and (vii) its ability to regulate.    

Until we meet again...

Is a century required to universally cover Egyptians with Social Health Insurance (SHI)?

Egypt's Road towards Social Health Insurance - The Road to be Traveled (2)

How much time to be expected for the Egyptians to be covered by health insurance? It took Egypt almost half a century to reach half of the Egyptians with health insurance coverage. Does it need Egypt another half of a century to cover its other half of population?

Some experts predict that it would take between 35-50 years to achieve universal coverage depending on the status of economic development of the country. Another group states that these predictions are based on historical world experience and therefore could be labeled “conservative”.  Let’s have a look at the experience of some of the well known countries for implementing social health insurance systems.

It took Germany more than a century (127 years) to achieve universal health insurance coverage following its establishment by Bismarck in 1883 by passing its first sickness law and it seems to be still developing. The largest part, almost 85% of the population, is covered by a basic national health insurance plan provided by the state, providing a standard level of coverage. The remainder 15% opted for private health insurance, which frequently offers additional benefits. It is claimed that only 0.3% or about 250,000 people in Germany are not insured.  A few of these uninsured people are extremely rich, not needing insurance, and most of them are poor unable to afford it.

In Japan, it took about 39 years to achieve universal coverage ignoring that many community-based health insurance schemes prevailed before that for decades.  The first health insurance law was issued in 1922, delayed its implementation to 1927 because of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923. The first “region-based” national health insurance law was issued in 1938, and was revised a number of times until universal coverage was declared in 1961 and the establishment of a Social Insurance Agency in 1962. However, development and revision of laws continued until maybe 1997 indicating that the process of development of social health insurance does not stop by achieving universal coverage but there would be room for further improvement probably to introduce more efficiency. Still you could note a lot of ongoing debate about health insurance coverage and costs.

In the Republic of Korea (ROK), it took 26 years to achieve universal population coverage from the inception of the statutory Health Insurance Act in 1963. ROK introduced compulsory health insurance program in 1977, and universal coverage was claimed in 1989. However, this was preceded by a voluntary program in 1965.  The relatively fast transition to universal coverage is mainly attributed to unexpected impressive increase in the average annual growth rate in GNP per capita of 13.3 per cent during the period 1977-89.

Further, it took 118 years in Belgium, 79 years in Austria, 72 years in Luxembourg, 48 years in Costa Rica to achieve universal health insurance coverage. As could be concluded from the above, not only universal health insurance needs time to grow, develop, and expand, it also happens on stages mainly depending on a country’s economic development, its ethical value system and other factors.  For example, it took 40 years in Austria (from 1890 to 1930) for population coverage to grow from 7 to 60 percent, and then another 35 years (from 1930 to 1965) to reach 96 percent. Further, it took 20 years for SHI to reach population coverage of 17 percent in Costa Rica (from 1941 to 1961), another 5 years to double coverage to 34 percent (1966), another 12 years to again double coverage to 74 percent (1978), and then another 13 years to attain 83 percent coverage (1991). 

It could be stated that Egypt introduced its health insurance scheme in 1936 and not as commonly known in 1964 by issuing Law 64/1936 that established employer’s responsibilities for work injuries.  Additional 5 laws were issued during the period 1936-1964. A Health Workers Organization was established in 1961 to provide health care services for the workers, which later became the Health Insurance Organization (HIO).  However, 1964 was considered the benchmark for the formal launching of health insurance through issuing a presidential decree 1209/1964 establishing the HIO taking over the responsibilities from the General Authority for Social Insurance and building on two laws defining the SHI premiums for government employees (Law 75/1964) and for public and private sector employees (Law 63/1964). The HIO started working in Alexandria with the intention of expanding SHI geographically to other regions and to the entire population.  Later, premiums were decreased for government employees (Law 32/1975). In the same year 1975, another law was issued defining additional benefits to government, public and private sector employees, as well as extending benefits to pensioners and widows (Law 79/1975). The latter two groups were covered without an employer contribution. It was not until 1992, that coverage was extended to school children (Law 99/1992), and followed by extending coverage to pre-school children (Law 380/1997).  If we take in consideration the evolvement of social health insurance since 1936, then some people might consider that it took Egypt about 75 years to reach coverage of health insurance of 57% based on HIO statistics.

Egypt might not be different from other countries and would need to own the enabling environment that allows social health insurance coverage to expand to the other half of the population. This would be the subject of a future blog.  

Until we meet again…

Egypt's Road towards Social Health Insurance - The Road to be Traveled (1)

In 2005, Egypt formally declared universal health insurance coverage of its population as its objective through the adoption of social health insurance (SHI).  This was an expansion to the original program that was introduced to Egypt's workers in 1964.  This coverage was expanded to those working in formal jobs in the public and private sector at different rates of contribution, allowing rich companies to opt out of the system. In addition, coverage was expanded to pensioners and widows. The latter coverage imposed additional burden on the system and it’s financing given the absence of contributions similar to those paid by the employers and due to the fact that these services are more expensive. All these measures might have disrupted the risk pooling function of the scheme limiting its capacity to raise enough funds to finance the system and its ability to provide the protection it is supposed to do. Thirty years later, with the inability of the system to cope with its expenses, SHI coverage was further compulsory expanded to Egypt's school children, and later, voluntary expanded to Egypt's preschool children. 

To date, insurance coverage has reached about half of the population, however; inequity is still a concern.  At the household level, a head of a family who is a civil servant and his daughter at school would be insured, while his housewife and his son in college wouldn’t be. Usually the poor and those working in the informal sector would not have access to health insurance services and would be expected to receive services at public health facilities.

The delay in expanding SHI coverage to the remaining half of Egypt’s population was blamed mainly on the underfunding of the health sector. Projections of a few billions of Egyptian pounds were quoted to be needed to fund the system in a sustainable manner.  While this remains true in case cost projections were built on estimating the cost per person for a certain package of services for a period of time; however, more money might not always mean better health; there might be room to introduce efficiency in the current system and make more funds available through running the system better.  Besides efficiency, there could be other areas that need to be examined.  Data indicates that the percent of Egypt’s GDP spent on health increased from 3.7% in 1995 to 5.9% in 2009; however, during the same period, the percentage of public health expenditures (which is what the government spends on health) from total expenditures on health decreased from one third to one fourth. Significantly, out-of-pocket expenditures (which are what the people spend on health) increased from half of the total expenditures on health in 1995 to nearly three quarters in 2009. These are considerably huge amounts of funds floating out of the pool of funds of SHI and decreasing more its ability of expanding its coverage.  Further and consistently, Egyptians spend one third of their treatment costs on pharmaceuticals. All of that suggest that there could be other factors that present obstacles on Egypt’s path to reach universal health insurance coverage.

But why do nations resort to SHI schemes in the first place? The most direct answer is to mobilize additional funds for health care. Underfunding of health care will lead to poor health outcomes, one of three main objectives of a health system.  The other two are usually rarely mentioned or given attention by those running health care systems, namely financial protection and client satisfaction, sometimes referred to as dignity. Financial protection means protection from large health expenditures that could bankrupt families leading to their impoverishment. Health expenditures were shown to be a primary cause of impoverishment, even for the rich and better off. Client satisfaction usually means to be treated in a humane form by your health care provider; in addition to many other things such as the perception that you are receiving quality care.  There are other reasons that a nation would resort to social health insurance.  William Hisao, the SHI guru mentioned some of these below, which could be valuable objectives by themselves: 

• to subsidize premiums for the poor rather than financing and providing universal health care for all, in case tax revenues are inadequate to fund health care of a reasonable quality for everyone
• to free up public funds so they can be targeted to public health goods and services;
• to separate the responsibilities for collecting and managing SHI financing from the responsibilities for providing health care to patients, whereby services are contracted from providers that are separate entities to be accountable to patients for the quality of services;
• to use the capacity of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private providers to improve access by the insured to health care by means of contracting.

He concludes that SHI is a financing approach for mobilizing funds and pooling risks. The newly mobilized funds should be allocated for the poor and near-poor to improve their financial access to health care. SHI may be a solution for a critical part of a nation’s systemic health care problem, but is not necessarily a solution for the whole problem.

This is the first of a series of blogs that will discuss the application of social health insurance in Egypt and its feasibility within the guidance provided by international literature.

Until we meet again...