Does Egypt adopt pro-poor health policies?

Towards a fairer and accountable Egyptian health care system

In an event, organized on March 1-3, 2013 in the beautiful city of Sharm El-Sheikh in Egypt, debating the theme of “health insurance for the poor”, one of the distinguished  presenters, Dr. Cristian Baeza,  stated the following “ a segregated system for the poor proved to be a poor system”.   Later in his presentation, he followed by stating “universal means the entire population, but paying particular attention to the poor is critical as they are historically postponed and not prioritized”.  Cristian was presenting lessons learned from countries from Latin America on their experiences in expanding universal health insurance coverage.  The question begged itself, “What does this mean for Egypt?” 

Before the January 25^th revolution, national health policy was applied universally with no particular priority set for improving health outcomes of the poor.  Allocations of budgetary funds for the health sector followed Ministry of Finance budget lines with no priority set for lagging regions or for those falling behind across population groups. With expected upcoming reforms to Egypt’s subsidy system, poverty rates would increase by several percentage points warranting putting in place a pro-poor health policy for protection of the poor and the vulnerable.

Traditionally, Egypt’s budget allocations are fragmented among a number of competing publicly-funded programs that hinder Egypt’s ability to pool risks and compromises Egypt’s path towards achieving universal health coverage.  The results of the health care system reflect evidence of unfairness.  In terms of health status, the nationwide progress made in reducing mortality among women, infants and children is not evenly distributed resulting in growing disparities in achieving MDG 4 (child mortality) and MDG 5 (maternal health) across geographic regions and income quintiles.  In terms of financial protection, the inability to protect the Egyptians from the impoverishing effects of health expenditures, especially against catastrophic illness is significant:  (i) the ongoing Social Health Insurance (SHI) excludes the poor as well as those who are in the informal sector, self-employed farmers or rural residents; and (ii) access to the Program for the Treatment on Expense of State (PTES) is also inequitable.  All resulted in three fourth of total health expenditure being spent out of pocket. In terms of client satisfaction and system responsiveness, service utilization by the poorest quintile of the population is the lowest for all types of health services, although the poor are more likely to utilize public health facilities than the better-off groups.  These are all consequences of the lack of a specific pro-poor health policy. 

Following the revolution for the last two years, governments and ministers of health were struggling to find ways to translate social justice into health programs that could reach the poor.  We’ve witnessed an active civil society movement organizing events and seminars, writing blogs and facebook threads going deep into discussing the nature of these programs and presenting serious proposals.  On the governmental side, A social health insurance law is in the making promising to cover the cost of premiums for the poor, however, with uncertainty about its sources of funding.  Already, a Law for expanding health insurance coverage of female-headed households has been issued; however, with a low turnout of beneficiaries showing up for enrollment.  A social justice budget was proposed to inject more funds in ongoing programs perceived to be underfunded such as Free Health Care, Program for the Treatment on the Expense of State, or for subsidized drugs and milk formula, and possibly fund school feeding programs.  However, the question remains: are these good examples of pro-poor programs?  Would they lead to a fairer health care system?

Recognizing the need for developing health policies and programs that promotes fairness and accountability in Egypt is essential and a first step.  A following and needed second step is to examine the ongoing health programs through a lens that can judge if these policies and programs are pro-poor or not. A third step will be to develop a health policy that keeps and consolidate those programs which are not only pro-poor but also efficient and effective, and ensuring that they are an integral part of the overall health care system.

 

Egypt’s Stunted Children: A Silent Cry of Social Injustice

Improving Health Outcomes of the Poor – A Social Justice Agenda for Egypt (2)

While Egypt has made impressive progress on each of the MDGs especially MDG 4 and 5, it continues to face challenges with MDG 1 relating to the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger. Moreover, regional disparities and gender inequalities continue to persist across governorates.

Malnutrition in Egypt is increasing.  In 2008, the prevalence of malnutrition increased than those figures reported in both 2000 and 2005.  Nationwide, 29% of children under the age of five are stunted, 6% are underweight, and 7% are wasted. The situation is likely to have further deteriorated since the continuing political instability following Egypt’s revolution at the start of 2011 as recently announced by CAPMAS indicating an increase in unemployment rates to 11.9% in September 2011 and poverty to 25% in 2012. National averages, however, obscure vast regional differences in undernutrition prevalence.

Nutrition is central to human and economic development.  Malnutrition frequently escapes full attention, and as a result is referred to as “the silent disaster.”  It rarely attracts the attention of policy and decision makers and never was on their agenda.  The most affected people are the poor, who lack a political voice preventing them from adequately demanding interventions to combat malnutrition, even if they realize that the problem exists.   Malnutrition is a barrier for development, and a determinant for economic development and poverty reduction, health status, and educational attainment, and its reduction is central to achieving these broader development goals.

The Window of Opportunity must be sized to avoid irreversible damage. Children who are undernourished between conception and age two are at high risk for impaired irreversible cognitive development and stunting, which adversely affects the country’s productivity and growth. Interventions outside this window of opportunity would only provide relief measures but will not be able to reverse the damage that happened.

The Cost of malnutrition is high for Egypt. Over one-third of child deaths are due to undernutrition, mostly from increased severity of disease. The economic costs of undernutrition and overweight include direct costs such as the increased burden on the health care system, and indirect costs of lost productivity. Childhood anemia alone is associated with a 2.5% drop in adult wages. The current economic crisis and its potential impact on the poor make investing in child nutrition more urgent than ever to protect and strengthen human capital in the most vulnerable groups in Egypt.

What is Stunting? Stunting implies long-term undernutrition and poor health among young children, measured as height-for-age. It is a striking form of social injustice. It means that stunted children were not allowed to attain their potential height and will be shorter than their peers.  Their IQ could probably be lower than their peers and will be less able to learn and accordingly will be less able to compete for jobs.

Three in ten Egyptian children under the age of five are stunted. Of these three, at least one is severely stunted. Lower Egypt Governorates have the highest rates of stunting, where one third of children U5 living in rural areas are stunted, and four in ten children U5 in urban areas are stunted. 

Surprisingly, neither the mother’s education nor the wealth quintiles, the usual suspects of bad indicators, affected the prevalence of stunting amongst children U5. The question remains: “why almost one third of Egypt’s children are stunted and on the increase, when all other health indicators are improving?” Maybe because it is not a health problem.  Unicef concludes that socioeconomic factors do not seem to have effect on the chronic malnutrition levels observed amongst Egyptian children and may suggest that there are a number of complex factors interfering with the proper nutrition of children. 

This means that more food or cash is probably not the solution, and it might be behavior related.  An intervention is needed that combines (i) behavior change including promotion of breastfeeding, appropriate complementary feeding practices (but excluding provision of food), and proper hygiene, specifically handwashing; and (ii) complementary and therapeutic feeding for the prevention and treatment of moderate malnutrition among children 6–23 months of age, and management of severe acute malnutrition among children under five years of age.

The key demand side package of service for such a problem is the promotion of optimal Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) practices and adequate nutrition during pregnancy.  It proved to be of a high potential to reduce malnutrition at relatively low cost and most effective if applied during the first 1000 days of life, from conception to 24 months as the effects of malnutrition are still reversible. However, these programs are difficult to implement without an adequate incentive for behavior change and usually better implemented by NGOs at community level. 

Beneficiaries would use existing health services provided by the MOHP for supply side services for treatment of moderate and severe malnutrition, for which the poorest districts with good functioning primary health care services would be selected.

Egypt, starting with Lower Egypt, will need an intervention that address both the demand and supply side of the problem at the same time with strong referral system between them through public private partnerships established between those implementing demand side services and those implementing supply side services.    

Until we meet again...

Improving Health Outcomes of the Poor – A Social Justice Agenda for Egypt

Health outcomes are usually measured in terms of the ability of health systems to introduce improvements in three areas: (i) health status; (ii) financial protection; and (iii) client satisfaction and dignity.  The challenges related to these health outcomes reflect an attention and priority to be provided to the poor and those potentially who could fall in poverty, an opportunity for adoption of a social justice agenda.

These challenges, which mainly indicate unfairness to the least advantaged group of the society, could be shortly summarized as follows:

In terms of health status, inequity that could be observed in disparities in achieving MDG 4 (child mortality) and MDG 5 (maternal health) across geographic regions and income quintiles.  Inequity is demonstrated by the persistent prevalence of high level of stunting, strongly linked to poverty. With the expected increase of non-communicable diseases and the high prevalence of hepatitis C, the burden of disease is expected to increase on Egyptians, especially the poor and probably would drive more people into poverty.

In terms of financial protection, the inability to protect the Egyptians from the impoverishing effects of health expenditures especially against catastrophic illness is significant.  This is presented by coverage of about half of the population with Social Health Insurance (SHI), inequity to access to Program for the Treatment on Expense of State (PTES), and that three fourths of total health expenditure is out of pocket.

In terms of client Satisfaction and system responsiveness, a nationwide dissatisfaction with the health care system presented by the high utilization rates and number of visits at private sector providers and the very low utilization rates at public health facilities. Further, utilization rates of the poor are the lowest among different income quintiles for all types of health services, although the poor are more likely to utilize public health facilities than the better off groups emphasizing the phenomenon of inequity.

There are other cross cutting developmental challenges that would affect the outcomes of the health sector that are important to consider such as stagnated fertility rates, high level of illiteracy, poor outcomes of the education system, high unemployment rates especially among the youth and in particularly among women, low rates and inequitable sanitation coverage, the rise and potential endemicity of avian flu, lack of proper social safety net to the poor, strong social and cultural factors expected to increase that would affect women empowerment. These would emphasize that parallel attention should be provided equally to the least advantaged in other sectors.

Positioning social justice at the center of the health sector agenda, taking in consideration the slogans that were raised by the January 25^th revolution and its context, would present a non-controversial theme to set related goals for the next five-year strategy as part of Egypt’s transition in the health sector.  This theme would be presented as Improving Health Outcomes of the Poor, as the least advantaged group of people in the society.  

A social justice agenda would naturally focus on the poor based on principles of distributive justice, a key principle would be the Difference Principle.  This principle stipulates that social and economic inequalities would be allowed in a community as long as they work to satisfy two conditions: (a) a fair equality of opportunity for all to compete for positions and offices; and (b) they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.  Its main moral motivation is to provide equal respect for persons whatever their social or natural status.  In order for that to happen, the least advantaged members of the society will be prioritized by redistributing resources to benefit them from the better off to raise their health status to a level equal to those in higher quintiles of income of the population, and that as a result this would allow them to have equal opportunity to compete for jobs and earn income. As well as it presents a favorable redistribution to those most affected group of the population in terms of poor health outcomes.

Improving the health outcomes of the poor would significantly contribute to improve Egypt's health goals and indicators in total, as the concentration of poor performance of the health system resides in poor areas.  

Setting goals under this theme would then focus on three elements that could be quantified:

(i)     improving the health status of the poor in specific regions (Regions such as Upper Egypt, Lower Egypt, Frontier governorates; or governorates such as Sohag, Assiut, Sharkia; or districts such as urban slums)

(ii)     protecting the population and especially the poor from the impoverishing effects of health expenditure and the near poor from getting poor

(iii)     seeking the poor’s satisfaction of service provision and treating them in a manner that preserves their dignity

If we pursue that route, we should be looking for improvements to be achieved at the health systems level to achieve the theme of improving health outcomes of the poor that would represent a possible continuation to the earlier efforts of reform of the health sector that started in 1996/1997 and hopefully coincides with it but with a more sharpened focus on the poor. This will be the subject of future posts

Until we meet again....

Is Social Health Insurance the Right Health Financing System for Egypt?

Egypt's Road towards Social Health Insurance - The Road to be Traveled (7)

At a time when Egypt is doing relatively well in reducing its child and maternal mortality, while facing extreme pressure on its budget to meet various demands by the public, in presence of notable inefficiencies in the health system presented mainly by fragmentation in the financing and the delivery of health services, and at a time when a draft social health insurance is presented for public discussion in a post-revolutionary situation that might allow to revisit health strategies designed in an earlier phase of reform, a question might be  posed before a final decision is made. Should Egypt stick to Social Health Insurance (SHI) as its main health financing strategy or could a better alternative scheme be available for Egypt to adopt. Is it too late to ask that question?

Governments usually aim to achieve universal coverage for health care for their people and people usually demands a health care system that meet their needs in terms of improved health, financial protection, and a system that is responsive and treat them with dignity.  To achieve that in Egypt, continues efforts have been put to reform the health care system increasingly since 1997; however, with modest efforts to include the public in that reform.  

Looking back, it is intriguing to note that during the last 60 years almost every attempt to reform the health sector in Egypt aiming to achieve this universal coverage promoting one health system or another as a means to achieve this end, ends up with an application of mixed and fragmented systems that were not able to meet the expectations demanded by the people.  I’ve always encountered this statement recurring in many international and national reports describing the health system in Egypt as “a pluralistic health system, consisting of a number of parallel public and private health care delivery systems and multiple financing intermediaries”.  The attempts to reform were not able to address this plurality and usually lead to more fragmentation of the system either at the delivery and/ or at the financing side ending up in a health system with multiple personalities.

The origin of this fragmentation has started a few decades ago, probably in the 50s and 60s, when two sets of parallel legalizations established the foundation for treatment on the expense of state (Presidential Decree 1754 in 1959 followed by Presidential Decree 1069 in 1964) and social health insurance (Law 75 in 1963 and Presidential Decree 1209 in 1964), probably trying to satisfy the demand of the people for better health care as well as a translation to Egypt’s constitutions placing the responsibility of provision of health care (Constitution 1956) and social insurance (Constitution 1964) including health to all Egyptians on the state.  These were followed by multiple additional decisions that further fragmented the delivery side that led to the proliferation of a number of governmental and public services delivery systems in addition to those of the Ministry of Health.  

And the question is “why is this happening?” Which system would be better for Egypt? A system based on general revenues and taxes or a system based on social health insurance?

Those who are in favor of tax-based systems argue for their system based on three points: (i) SHI discourages firms from hiring workers, and hence reduces employment and encourages informal labor markets; (ii) lack of coverage among certain groups during the often long period between establishing SHI and achieving universal coverage, and (iii) systematic variations in benefit packages and quality of care across subpopulations. 

On the other hand, those who promote SHI do that based on two points: (i) SHI provides an important additional source of revenue for the health system; (ii) by separating the purchasing of health care from its provision and encouraging selective contracting between providers (including private sector ones), SHI systems are able to achieve better quality health care at a lower cost than tax-financed health systems.

Certain studies focusing on studying the impact of these health systems on health outcomes in OECD countries suggested that SHI systems, on balance (i) have certain characteristics that make them more expensive than tax-financed systems,  (ii) do no better in terms of most health outcomes that are amenable to medical care despite the extra spending, (iii) may do worse in respect of outcomes that require strong population-level public health programs, and (iv) do worse in terms of encouraging informal labor markets and discouraging employment.  The findings of this study raise the following questions:

•  Why do we apply a system that could cost us more with no additional improvement in health outcomes at a time when budgets are tight? Would this contribute to efficiency?
•  Why do we apply a system that could increase informality in the employment sector when already two thirds of those working are informal workers without protection? Would this contribute to financial and social protection?
• Are there dangers on our achievements in public health? As SHI systems focus on individual members, or even families, would we lose the focus on the entire population by public health programs financed by tax-financed systems?  Would this contribute to improved health status and outcomes?

All of the above would lead to the following question, and another two subsidiary questions?

Can we apply in Egypt a system that can capture the better of the two systems and avoid their problems?

Question 1:  Can we have a tax-based system with a directly managed provider network shift to a purchaser-provider-contracting model?

Under this scenario purchaser organizations contract with providers rather than manage them directly.  This can be done by adopting the SHI purchaser-provider split model where purchaser organizations contract with providers, including those which are not public providers.  This could lead to lower expenditures and better health outcomes.  However, to what extent this can be done without risking coherence and integration in its public health programs? The Egypt experience in introducing the Family Health Funds, governorate health insurance organizations that were established to do the purchasing function, is an example of an attempt in that regard. The ownership of these organizations between the Ministry of Health and the Health Insurance Organization remained for a long time and it failed to elaborate a national organization that would provide oversight for such decentralized bodies called the National Family Health Fund.  Further, this was countered by the Ministry of Health by establishing provider organizations at district level called the District Provider Organizations to ensure the flow of funds through its organization, which were dismantled later as the Egyptian health system geared more towards social health insurance..

Or Question 2: Can SHI system increase its reliance on tax revenues and capture some of the tax-based finance system functions?

This seems to be feasible to be done and the latest versions of the new social health insurance law provides different articles that attempt to increase its tax base and revenues from sources other than that from payroll taxes, although earmarked taxes is being proposed. This is the new experience that has been facing long debate before and after the January 25^th revolution, and seems to continue for a while. The linkage of health insurance to family health services could be the basis for protecting the screening functions of public health programs.

At the end, a decision will need to be made by those who will represent Egypt in the new People’s Assembly and will then need to be implemented by the newly elected government in a few months to come.  This decision will need to select the system, SHI systems or tax-financed systems, which on balance would spend less, achieve better health, easier to go through the transition, and lead to better labor market outcomes.  

Until we meet again...

A Framework for Reading Egypt’s Social Health Insurance Law

Egypt's Road towards Social Health Insurance - The Road to be Traveled (6)

This blog is based on the work of international experts in the field of social health insurance that was adapted to Egypt's situation. Arabic versions of this blog will dig into more details of the framework but might not follow the same sequence of this blog. Because of limitations of space, some ideas presented in this blog will be discussed separately in future blogs.

The recent news about the upcoming law for social health insurance in Egypt and the messages transmitted about its potential modifications to ensure its achievement of social justice raised the question about how to read such laws and what should be included in it.  To help read this kind of social laws, once officially published for public dialogue, the presence of a reference framework could assist in that regard. In this blog, we will try to contribute some inputs that may assist in the preparation of such a framework, which we do not claim it will be comprehensive. This blog will not attempt to review or criticize the content of the currently circulated versions of SHI law.  As well, this blog will not differentiate between what should be mentioned as articles of the law itself or articles of its executive regulations due to their complementarily nature.

The logic of a social health insurance law would probably include the following:

• Definition of the social health insurance system
• How to make effective the mandatory and universal features of the system
•  Principles that the govern the system
• Transition from the current situation to an integrated and unified system
• Definition of terms
• Who are the Beneficiaries
• What to finance
• How to finance the new system
• Definition and main characteristics of the institution that will manage the system, including governance, functions, powers, financial management, and accountability
• Purchasing health care goods and services
• Consumer protection
• Role of Voluntary health insurance

The Definition. In defining the social health insurance system three aspects are to be considered:

1.  The nature of the social health insurance system
2. The objective of the social health insurance system
3. The institutional structure to implement the social health insurance system.

Also three main characteristics of the system would need to be taken into account:

1. Universal, meaning that it includes all Egyptian citizens
2. Mandatory, that is, all Egyptian citizens must participate (there is no opting out from paying into the system); 
3. Gradual, full inclusion of all citizens (with few exemptions) into the system over a defined period of time, OR Abrupt

The Principles. These usually refer to: solidarity; unit of subscription (family or individual); basis on need or demand; scope of services (primary, secondary, tertiary); subscription basis (mandatory?), financing not provision and separation of financing from provision; role of private for profit and non-profit in service provision based on contracting; role of state in financing the poor and near poor (partially or fully); tax exemptions for subscriptions; role of private health insurance (duplicative, complementary, supplementary)

The Transition. A a transition plan from a presently fragmented institutional structure dominated by the HIO to a single institutional structure in the future will be required.  Details for this transition could take place and developed in regulatory decrees.  An article in the law might state the principles for transition.  The transition would describe the way forward to arrive over time at an “integrated” (meaning putting in one place a social health insurance system. Four issues related to transition would need to be noted:

1. The responsibility of management of the system during transition
2. The management of enrollment of all non-covered citizens;
3. The management of those already covered by the existing HIO system and their enrollment into the new SHI if required, under a one “unified” system (in that case meaning the system managed by a single organization);  
4. The relationship to other existing parallel health care financing systems such as the Program for Treatment on the Expense of State (PTES)  and those funds flowing for public health services provision for curative care in Egypt.

The Institution. Social health insurance systems can only be implemented through an institutional structure.  A future entity might be established, which could be (a) a re-structured HIO, or (b) a totally new entity transformed into the unified entity for the management of the integrated social health insurance system with its own legal autonomous status. The law and/or its regulations will need to define the aspects that will be mandated for the future organization such as governance, autonomy, structure, functions, powers or attributes, contracting, and regional offices.

What to Finance. The law will need to refer to a unified set of social health insurance benefits, the health care goods and services covered by social health insurance for health care. The set of benefits usually is to be determined and updated by regulatory decrees to be provided by participating providers and for secondary care on referral of the gatekeeper.  The law also should require that the set of benefits is to be determined on an actuarial analysis to project financial implications.  Finally, there is a need to entrust the decision-making on defining and updating the set of benefits into the social health insurance entity to preclude political influence that could disturb the goal of fiscal responsibility

How to Finance. Financing would better be presented in the form of groups to be covered classifying those into three sectors (formal; informal; and targeted subsidized). The figures for financing, preferably and if the constitution allows, should not be included in the law itself as they would be subject for future change; however, this might be difficult in Egypt. To mitigate that articles will need to indicate that it will reviewed on periodic basis based on actuarial studies conducted by the Government. This applies to contributions and subsidies, as well as for co-payment levels

Providers and Suppliers - Contracting. Articles should stipulate that the social health insurance entity is a financial institution that funds the provision of health care goods and services to public and private providers.  Selection of providers and suppliers should be stated for those who meet the requirements for contracting with the entity to ensure that providers and suppliers meet licensing and certification requirements, among others, and for improving quality of care.

Consumer Protection. Articles that protect the interest of consumers will need to be included that reflects a framework for a system of consumer protection that could be part of the regulations. 

Voluntary Health Insurance. If the policy is to have a private/public mix in health care financing and delivery, then articles that allow individuals to purchase voluntary health insurance will need to be included.  These services could be duplicative, supplemental or complementary, but only after certified satisfaction of payment of social health insurance contributions

Until we meet again....

Expanding Universal Population Coverage through Social Health Insurance in Egypt

Egypt's Road towards Social Health Insurance - The Road to be Traveled (4)


Today, the focus will be on the breadth of coverage of universal coverage; i.e. population coverage. The other two elements of universal coverage are: (i) the depth of coverage; i.e. the content of package of services provided; and (ii) the height of coverage; i.e. financial protection.


Financing of universal coverage could be achieved through a number of options, where essentially two of them are usually used: (i) a general tax revenue system; and (ii) a social health insurance scheme.  Under general tax revenue, health services will be provided by a network of public and in some instance private providers may be contracted, often referred to as a national health service or commonly known as NHS.   A classical example is the National Health System in the United Kingdom.  We will focus on population coverage using social health insurance.

Social health insurance, or commonly known as SHI, usually requires contributions and to succeed would require compulsory enrollment of all population.  However, this is not always the case applied.  The easiest groups to enroll, and usually the first, are the workers (civil servants and employees) in the government and public sector organizations, followed by employees in the private sector organizations and enterprises.  Contributions are necessary to fund the system and these come from the worker’s salary and the employer’s share of contribution.  It gets more difficult when enrollment of those self-employed starts as they need to pay both shares, being themselves the worker and the employer.  As they are sometimes better off, they would resist to get enrolled and according them pay more than others.  It becomes more complicated when enrollment of those working in the informal sector starts to happen.  These are difficult to know as well as difficult to reach. Many of them do not earn enough, usually not on a regular basis. If they have an employer, usually the first thing an employer would do is evade payment of his/her contribution.  Lastly, there are the poor who cannot afford to pay any contributions at all, and the government is expected to cover the cost of their contributions. The government could also consider covering fully or partially the cost of contributions of those workers in the formal sector. 


In Egypt, at this stage in 2011, we have all these mixes.  Part of the population is covered though general tax revenue. They are either accessing health care directly through the public health network, or indirectly financed through the Program on the Expense of State.  Workers in government, public and private organizations, school children, pensioners, widows are covered through the SHI system.  Pre-school aged children are covered through a voluntary system. The Health Insurance Organization owns its health care network of providers and to some smaller extent contracts other public health sector care organizations and the private sector.  Accordingly, those who are not covered by SHI (but theoretically covered by the system financed by general tax revenue) are the self-employed, those working in the informal sector, and the poor. In addition, an important group exists that don’t fall under the above mentioned categories, the dependants of HIO workers.  This group resulted because expansion of coverage did not follow the above mentioned trend and started to cover certain categories separately outside their families (preschool and school children).  To complicate the situation, there is a particular group that the law allowed to opt out of SHI, i.e., they are allowed to get covered either by their own network of service providers or they purchase insurance coverage from the private sector.  These are the public and private sector organizations and enterprises that pay a minimum percentage about 1%.   A main problem with that is that once the employees retire they are dumped back on the public system that is financed from general tax revenue, when they are sick and less able to pay and when the cost of their care is most expensive. 


Looking forward, extending SHI to new groups takes a long time usually decades and depends on the economic development of the country, in addition to other factors.  It usually happens on stages.  A strategy for population coverage will need to be developed and should be publicly discussed.  Efforts for building a consensus need to be devoted and decision need to be reached who should be covered first and in which sequence.  In the next few paragraphs, I would like to describe one of many possible scenarios to do that.  The priory setting for population coverage and the scenario for sequencing to be adopted by the Egyptians will need to be based on the country’s social, economic, fiscal, and political considerations at the time of decision.  A scenario is proposed below:

(1)  The first group recommended to be targeted is the dependants of HIO workers. This could be the easiest group to start with since the head of the household would already be registered and contributing through the HIO contribution system.  It would practical to use the existing social insurance system to extend HIO coverage to the dependents of its workers.  They could contribute towards their coverage at revised rates according to the size of the household and the defined benefits package for the new beneficiaries.

(2) The second group is the poor, the unemployed, and other vulnerable groups.  It is estimated that one out of every five Egyptians is living in poverty in 2009. This group of beneficiaries should, in principle, be eligible for exemption from premium contributions and copayments.  Their contributions will need to be fully subsidized through the government budget.   In order to target the exemptions effectively to minimize both leakage (extending benefits to the ineligible) and gaps (denying benefits to the eligible), the system used by the Ministry of Social Solidarity to identify the poor should be the basis for enrollment of the poor, even if there are questions about its targeting ability. This would need to be closely linked with the reforms in the social safety net and social assistance programs to ensure that the targeting system is actually reaching the poor. The subsidization of the poor under the SHI requires adequate and sustainable fiscal resources. A significant portion of the resources required is already available in the form of the historical supply-side subsidization of government health care providers. The challenge lies in shifting from supply-side subsidization to subsidization of premium payments for the poor. Another significant portion of the resources is available in the other types of subsidy, the energy subsidy.

(3) The third group and the most difficult to enroll is the currently do not contribute to or participate in the social insurance system. Their health care needs are covered through PTES for catastrophic illness, the public health care system, or through direct purchase of private health services especially if they are non-poor. To the extent that the recent tax reforms succeed in giving the informal workforce legal status, a segment of these workers will be brought into the formal social insurance system.  Participation in the social insurance system would require either enforcing a contribution system (means-tested) that estimates their income or assets, or establishing a contribution system (risk-rated) designed to encourage voluntary participation. Both systems involve administrative costs and certain risks. These risks could be mitigated if the self employed and informal sector workers could be organized into groups such as affinity groups and associations that could form the basis for a collective contribution mechanism. Finally, their willingness to contribute will depend on the perceived value of the benefits offered through social insurance. If the benefits are perceived to be inadequate and of poor quality, then the incentives would be to avoid contributions.

Because this scenario would significantly expand the number of HIO beneficiaries, this step would also require concurrent capacity building and reforms within the HIO to absorb these new beneficiaries.  Within SHI, a number of health insurance functions need to be operational.  For example registration, collection of contributions, contracting and reimbursement of providers usually should be executed.  Finally, we would like to emphasize that the SHI requires enrollment to be compulsory, to the extent possible.  Accordingly, for SHI to be more likely financially sustainable, the government would need to ensure that the premiums for preschool children are paid from government tax revenues and that those who opted out should pay their full share of premiums (employers and workers).


In summary, coverage of the dependants of HIO workers seem to be the most likely and feasible group to start with on the short term.  This is followed by coverage of the poor, which would require much longer time based on the available fiscal space; i.e. how much funds would be allocated for coverage of the poor or how much funds could reallocated from other sources such as energy subsidy or the PTES.  The last groups, which are usually the most difficult groups to enroll and cover are the self-employed and those working in the informal sector.  


Until we meet again...

Analyzing Universal Coverage of Health Care in Egypt

Egypt's Road towards Social Health Insurance - The Road to be Traveled (3)

Coverage could be analyzed in terms of breadth, depth, and height, with breadth indicating coverage in terms of population; depth indicating coverage in terms of service provided; and height indicating coverage in terms of the extent of financial protection. A universal coverage system can be evaluated as effective when the above three dimensions are completely filled securing access to adequate healthcare for all at an affordable price. I will try to compile below from different sources some of their findings about universal coverage of health care in Egypt.

In terms of breadth of coverage, coverage in terms of population, Egyptians' coverage is provided through a combination of social health insurance and subsidized government health services. Currently, Social health insurance coverage, provided through the Health Insurance Organization (HIO), covers about 42.3 million person, representing 57 percent of the population (as per the information provided by HIO official website). The bulk of the population under HIO coverage (74 percent) is schoolchildren and infants, and the smallest bulk (6% percent) is widows and pensioners.  The remaining 20% insured are from the active labor force. The Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP) and other government agencies function as an “insurer of last resort” providing free or substantially subsidized health services to the citizens not covered under HIO.  Further, a Program of Treatment at the Expense of State (PTES) was established to extend financial assistance to all Egyptian citizens for expenses incurred for government spending on health care.  Originally, it was designed to cover those not covered by HIO for catastrophic illness, however, its current coverage extended to those who can access it and its funding has been and still expanding.  

Taking a closer look at coverage by social health insurance, we can conclude that its coverage is fragmented by beneficiaries. For historical reasons, Egypt’s social insurance system has developed into multiple programs with different coverage and benefits package for various segments of the population, resulting in a patchwork of coverage. In a typical Egyptian family, the father, a public or private sector employee, will be covered by HIO Law No.79/1975; his wife, a government employee, would be covered by Law No.32/1975 or not covered if she is a housewife; his son, a university student, will not be covered; his daughter, a school student, will be covered by HIO Law No. 99/1992; and his infant child would be covered by a decree 380/ 1997. About one-half of the population, mostly the unemployed, self-employed, and informal sector workers and out-of-school children, are not covered under the HIO system.

In terms of depth of coverage, coverage by services provided, population are receiving different package of services based on the health care system they are accessing. The uninsured population depends on free or subsidized government health services through a nationwide network of government health care providers based on the package provided ranging from primary to tertiary health care services.  The main factors for determining access are services availability, quality, and level of funding. In the early years of 2000, MOHP introduced the concept of family medicine/family health services with the purpose of rationalizing of health services; reorganizing the delivery of primary health care services around families instead of individuals; establishing of family health services as the gatekeeper for the delivery of health care services, a clear referral system to be linked at a future point of time to health insurance; establishing quality standards for service delivery; and ensuring the availability of adequate funding for it through establishing family health funds.

The insured population receives an unlimited package of package of services as defined by law.  The different laws in effect under the HIO result in different systems of benefits and copayments, which complicate the effective administration of the program. Members of the same household have different coverage depending on their status within the household.

The “uninsured” population has access to the PTES for hospitalization and related high-cost health services. However, the PTES is a passive reimbursement scheme not related to any contribution systems or to a well defined benefits package. In a limited number of governorates access to primary care services is financed through the Family Health Fund, but this remains a pilot program without a clear institutional base.

In terms of height of coverage, the extent of financial protection, the best way to measure that is out-of-pocket expenditures.  Out-of-pocket expenditures represents the share of household spending on health care either paid directly to private health providers or pharmacies, or paid indirectly in terms of additional cost paid to receive public health services.  The more it increases the more the population is at risk and less covered by financial protection.  Despite the presence of different types of health coverage provided by the MoHP and the HIO, between 1996 and 2009 the share of direct household spending increased from 50 percent of total health spending to 72 percent. Based on an international report, the reasons for that were presented as follows: First, the level of benefits covered under the HIO or provided by MOHP and other government public health network could be perceived as limited in scope and requires beneficiaries to make additional payments to obtain services not covered. Second, the proportion of the labor force participating in HIO with ability to contribute regularly is low (only 20 percent). Third, the cost containment exercised by HIO could be shifting costs onto households. Fourth, the PTES requires a significant level of cost-sharing by patients; therefore, the expansion of PTES would be accompanied by a concomitant increase in household spending to cover the balance of payments. Fifth, the quality of subsidized government health services may be inadequate (shortage of drugs in health facilities, lack of responsiveness), forcing many households to seek private providers. Recent trends in budget allocation in government health services show that operating and maintenance costs have not kept pace with needs, possibly contributing to inadequate supply of drugs and other essential materials at government health care providers. This would leave many households heavily reliant on out-of-pocket spending and vulnerable to financial stress in the event of a catastrophic illness or injuries.

Until we meet again...